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Institute for Policy Research 
What are the prospects for 
a wage recovery in the UK?
POLICY BRIEF
About this research
Between 1978 and 2008 real wages grew at nearly 2% per year. 
Although, during past recessions real wages fell short of this trend, as unemployment fell the wage 
recovery not only re-ignited wage growth, but made up the lost ground.
Since 2008, Britain has experienced an unprecedented and protracted fall in real wages as earnings are 
not keeping pace with the cost of living, normally measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Real 
wages have fallen by 10% and are now nearly 20% below the level that would exist today had trend 
wage growth continued. This equates to a loss of earnings of just under £5,000 per year for the typical 
worker. 
This fall in real wages has helped keep unemployment down through the Great Recession; which is now 
approaching 6%, some three years earlier than in the last recession. However, the price paid in below 
trend earnings growth continues to rise rapidly. The question is: what are the prospects for a wage 
recovery in the UK and what can policy achieve to address the falling value of wages?
Research from the University of Bath - conducted by Professor Paul Gregg and Dr Mariña Fernández-
Salgado (Department of Social and Policy Sciences) - compares employment, wage and cost of living 
data over two distinct periods of recession and recovery (1990-2001 and 2004-2014). 
Wages and unemployment since the crash 
Since 2008, Britain has experienced an unprecedented 
and protracted fall in real wages as earnings are not 
keeping pace with the cost of living, normally measured 
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Figure 1 plots the 
growth of (nominal) wages and prices, and provides a 
trend line showing what wage growth would have looked 
like if the trend in real wage growth over the last 30 years 
(that is wages adjusted for prices) had continued. It 
shows that wages have grown more slowly than prices. 
Indeed, real wages have fallen by more than 10%, and 
are now some 20% below the level that would exist today 
had prior wage trends continued. This equates to falls of 
£2,500 per year in real terms for the typical British worker, 
and £5,000 per year below trend.
This fall in real wages has helped keep unemployment 
down through the Great Recession. As Figure 2 shows, 
unemployment rose from 5% to just over 8% in this 
recession. These rates are well below those experienced 
in the 90s, and the peak in unemployment occurred 
shortly after the recession hit. The recovery has seen 
unemployment fall to near 6% some three years earlier 
than after the last recession. Thus, the story in the labour 
market since the crash has been one of relative benign 
unemployment combined with far worse wage outcomes. 
Whether this is a better or worse combination will depend 
on whether the current fall in unemployment is matched 
by a wage recovery in the UK in line with that seen after 
past recessions. 
Source: ONS, Average Weekly Earnings
Source: ONS, Consumer Price Indices – CPI annual 
percentage change: 1989 to 2014
Figure 1: Average weekly earnings, prices and trend 
wage trajectory (2008 – 14)  
Key messages for policy 
•	 Since 2008, real wages have fallen by 10% 
and are now nearly 20% below the level that 
would exist today had trend wage growth 
continued. This equates to a loss of earnings 
of just under £5,000 for the typical British 
worker.  
•	 Unemployment peaked two and a half 
years ago (October 2011), and has fallen 
rapidly over the last fifteen months. After 
the 1990s recession, the real wage recovery 
was well underway two years after the peak 
in unemployment, with subsequent wage 
growth recuperating all wage losses and 
returning to trend within eight years. The 
wage recovery this time is a long way behind 
schedule.  
•	 This unprecedented fall in real wages 
has been driven by the greater sensitivity 
of wages to unemployment, a six year 
stagnation in productivity levels, and a de-
coupling of median wages from productivity 
growth, which reflects top earners and 
pensions taking a larger portion of the wage 
cake. 
•	 Falling unemployment alone will not re-start 
sustained wage growth. Productivity growth, 
and in turn business and infrastructure 
investment, needs to re-start.  
•	 In addition, for a broad-based wage 
recovery, the real wages of typical workers 
needs to be linked to productivity, as was 
the historic norm. Without correcting this, 
any wage recovery will be focused on top 
earners not ordinary workers.
www.bath.ac.uk/ipr
Source: Calculated from ONS, Average Weekly Earnings and ONS,  
Consumer Price Indices – CPI annual percentage change: 1989 to 2014
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For this recovery to match the last one we would 
expect unemployment to fall toward pre-recession 
levels - which it is rapidly - but also for real wages to 
rise by nearly 20%; a prospect that seems unlikely as 
wages continue to lag behind inflation. 
Why has this extraordinary fall in real wages 
occurred? 
Research, with Professor Steve Machin (London 
School of Economics), has explored why this 
unprecedented fall in wages has occurred. It identifies 
three major causal factors:  
Greater sensitivity of wages to unemployment 
Wages have become more sensitive to movements 
in unemployment through this recession, compared 
to the past. Our research suggests that a doubling 
of unemployment from say 4 - 8% is found to push 
wages some 14% below trend whereas this was 
around 7% in the past. But as unemployment falls this 
should swing back again with a period of above trend 
growth, although this happens with a lag of around a 
year. Hence, after the 1990s recession unemployment 
peaked in 1993, but it was only from 1994 that wage 
growth re-started, and only from 1996 that wage 
growth was faster than trend. The unemployment 
rise through this recession has been moderate and 
peaked in October 2011, but was broadly flat from 
the beginning of 2010 to the middle of 2013, at just 
over 8% (see Figure 2). Given that unemployment 
peaked in 2011, the expectation would be that real 
wage growth should have re-started by 2013, and be 
progressing to above trend now as unemployment 
falls rapidly. Yet, real wages continued to fall 
throughout 2013 and the first half of 2014.
Figure 2: ILO unemployment rates (1988 – 2014
 
Source: ONS, ILO Unemployment Rates (1988 – 2014)
Figure 3b: Real median weekly earnings and trend 
trajectory 2008 - 2014
  
Figure 3: Real Median Weekly earnings and trend 
trajectory 1990 – 2001 and 2008 - 2014
Figure 3a: Real median weekly earning and trend 
trajectory 1990 – 2001
Comparisons with the past 
Figure 3 (left-hand side panel) shows how wage 
stagnation and growth played out through the 
recession and recovery in the 1990s. During the 
recession real wages didn’t fall, but grew below 
trend, causing a gap to emerge between actual and 
expected wage levels. The gap peaked at around 5% 
in 1994; a year or so after unemployment had started 
to fall. From this point, real wage growth quickly 
returned to trend. From 1996, as unemployment 
started to fall more rapidly, wages grew above trend, 
and by 2001, when unemployment fell to levels 
below those seen in the late 1980s, wages were 
some 20% higher than at the onset of the recession. 
By comparison, the right-hand side panel tells the 
story of wage stagnation and growth for the Great 
Recession. 
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The importance of productivity growth 
The fact that wage recovery is well behind schedule 
is not in itself overwhelming evidence that underlying 
real wage growth is stagnant. Figure 4 makes a 
bigger point; that underlying trend earnings growth 
moves in line with improvements in economic 
efficiency as reflected in productivity. The figure 
shows that real total compensation (a broad measure 
of wages, including National Insurance and pension 
contribution costs paid by employers) closely tracks 
total productivity per hour. Productivity growth has 
been stalled at levels slightly below those of the pre-
recession peak of 2008 for six years, and the latest 
figures show that there is still no sign of an increase. 
Without the steady rate of 2% productivity growth per 
annum that Britain enjoyed prior to the crash, there 
will not be any sustained rise in real wages.
De-coupling of wages from productivity 
Figure 4 also charts two other measures of wages. 
The first is average wages per hour (a measure that 
excludes the non-labour costs included in total 
compensation). Average wages have been growing 
slightly slower than productivity since the early 2000s. 
The lower line is median wages per hour (the hourly 
wage received by the typical British worker). Median 
wages have been growing below productivity since 
the early 1990s, and markedly so since the early 
2000s. The growing gap between median wages and 
productivity suggests that ordinary British workers are 
no longer benefiting from improvements in economic 
efficiency in the economy. Rather the benefits of 
improving economic efficiency have gone to meeting 
firms’ pension obligations, mostly to workers who are 
already retired (represented by the gap between total 
compensation and average earnings), and also to top 
earners, who have enjoyed very rapid wage growth 
and who drive the gap between average and median 
wages.
This ‘de-coupling’ of productivity from median 
earnings growth is a phenomenon the UK shares with 
the United States; where the extent of de-coupling 
has been so extreme that there have been no 
sustained increases in median hourly earnings for 30 
years, despite a strong productivity performance. 
In summary, the UK’s unprecedented fall in real 
earnings reflects a higher sensitivity of wages to 
unemployment, a Europe-wide problem of poor 
productivity and a de-coupling of earnings from 
productivity, which is shared with the US. It appears 
that only Britain has combined all three of these 
factors at the same time.
Of course, these patterns are linked. Falling real 
wages combined with the difficulty of accessing 
investment loans from banks, has encouraged firms 
to use extra cheap workers rather than investing in 
capital. From 2008 to 2009, business investment 
fell by 14%, and has yet to recover this lost ground; 
creating flat productivity and the (relatively) good 
picture for employment. In turn, poor productivity 
performance offers little hope for a rise in real wages. 
  
  
Source: Median and mean real wages from New Earnings 
Survey/ Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (GDP deflated). 
Labour productivity from ONS.  Labour productivity is 
constructed as real GDP over total actual weekly hours worked. 
The GDP is published in the ONS Quarterly National Accounts 
and total actual weekly hours are calculated using the Labour 
Force Survey. Annual Compensation from ONS and OECD. 
Annual compensation is constructed as total compensation 
of employees (GDP deflated) over share of employment. Total 
compensation of employees is published in the ONS Quarterly 
National Accounts and share of employment (number of 
employees over total employment) is extracted from the OECD. 
Figure 4: Labour productivity and annual 
compensation (mean and median wages)
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Bringing back real wage growth 
The recent rapid fall in unemployment, since the 
summer of 2013, should be sufficient to stop real 
wage falls by the end of 2014. Continued falls 
should lead to a modest wage recovery, but alone 
such gains will cease two to three years after 
unemployment stops falling. For a sustained wage 
recovery, the economy also needs to generate a 
return to the levels of productivity growth seen over 
the 25 years before the crash, but that have been 
notably absent over the last six years. As labour 
gets scarce and more expensive, we should expect 
firms to increase investment generating productivity 
improvements. However, even this will not be enough 
for sustained real wage gains unless the distribution 
of the returns from productivity growth can be 
channelled back to ordinary workers, in the way they 
were before the start of the new millennium. 
Policy implications 
There are three necessary conditions that need to 
be met in order for the earnings of British workers 
to regain the 20% (or £5,000 per year) loss in real 
wages. These are falling unemployment, steady 
improvements in economic efficiency and improved 
wage equality. Falling unemployment has been 
achieved, however it will only be strong enough 
to lift wages, if there is a return to previous trend 
productivity growth and median wages are recoupled 
to productivity.  
A return to improving economic efficiency requires a 
major boost to business investment to recover lost 
ground since the financial crash. It also reflects a 
need for investment in infrastructure and housing to 
reduce inflationary pressures. Reconnecting earnings 
of typical British workers to productivity is a complex 
issue, and requires addressing rising inequality in 
the labour market. The hardest agenda politically, 
is to control the extraordinarily rapid increases in 
pay and pensions to executives, which has far 
outstripped company profitability, so that productivity 
improvements benefit all workers.
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